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Abstract  
 
Science diplomacy is coming to the fore as a formidable dimension of inter-state 
power relations. As the challenges of the world increasingly transcend borders, so 
too have researchers and innovators forged international coalitions to resolve global 
pathologies. In doing so, new channels of influence and opportunity have opened up 
for states alongside the ‘traditional’ modes of foreign diplomacy. Understanding how 
these channels influence global socio-economic outcomes is thereby crucial for 
scholars interested in the still-ambiguous structure and processes of global 
governance. This article advances understanding of the domains of science 
diplomacy by drawing attention to the ‘political intercostalities’ of state actors, 
scientific communities and other transnational actors within the new architectures of 
global governance. Here we trace the growing array of informal international 
associations alongside transgovernmental policy networks and ‘global public-policy 
partnerships’ that deal with highly specialised and technical matters of international 
policy and how they are drawn into science diplomacy. This article thus presents a 
research agenda for a particular mode of ’impact’ in politics and international studies.  
 
 
Introduction 
Science matters; but science and the ideas of scholars and scientific researchers 
also need to be made to matter. Diplomacy is one field of policy and decision-making 
where science can be transformative (Federoff, 2009; Lord & Turekian, 2007). In 
recent years, social and natural science researchers have increasingly become 
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transnational actors in public policy and global governance (see Jasanoff, 2004; 
Stone 2013). Aided by modern digital communication technologies, research and 
cross-border collaboration can proceed apace through multi-national research 
networks, achieving momentous feats of scientific discovery from the observation of 
the Higgs boson at CERN, to the gene-editing innovation of CRISPR (Lander 2015), 
or identifying the SARS coronavirus. This is the picture of scholarly research that 
chips away at the fundamental challenges of the social and natural world. It is why 
the EU introduced pan-EU collaborative FET Flagships funding for ‘visionary, 
science-driven, large-scale research initiatives addressing grand Scientific and 
Technological (S&T) challenges’. One project, The Human Brain Project, involves an 
astonishing 112 partners from across the globe (Horizon 2020, 2017). This is truly 
research without borders.  
 
As research partnerships spanning borders become prominent in their social and 
economic potential, they have generated a distinct and new transnational political 
dynamic: we contend this dynamic is discernible in international research networks 
operating as mechanisms through which knowledge organisations and scientific 
communities become entwined with the governance ambitions of international 
organisations and the foreign policy concerns of governments. We have already 
seen, for example, how developed countries can leverage innovation as a form of 
developmental aid: using science to eradicate preventable diseases, develop hardy 
cash crops, or share irrigation and water purification technologies.  
 
Scholarly research, as readers of this Special Issue will be already be aware, is 
increasingly beholden to the imperatives of social, political or economic impact. This 
is the gearing of Universities, as a matter of government policy, to underwrite the 
‘prosperity of national and global knowledge economies’ and act as ‘gate-keepers of 
an information society’ (Watermeyer, 2014, 359). In short, science is becoming – if it 
has not already become – a prominent new ‘plane’ of transnational relationships, and 
thus a site of interstate contestation. 
 
In this paper, we have three ambitions: First we address a particular manifestation 
and practice of impact – science diplomacy. This practice and process connects not 
only political science, public policy and international relations but the ‘hard’ sciences 
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more generally, with policy making.  Although seen by some as ‘well-established’ at 
the ‘intersection of research policy and foreign affairs’ (Fahnrich, 2015), others 
consider this type of diplomatic practice to be a ‘crucial, if under-utilized, speciality’ of 
states (Turekian in Davis & Patman, 2015). 
 
Second, we advance the conceptualisation of science diplomacy by taking it beyond 
its roots in methodological nationalism to address new and expanding domains for 
research impact generally, and science diplomacy specifically, by focusing upon 
transnational venues of governance. Today, science diplomacy occurs via a 
fragmented, complex and networked cast of non-state actors, agencies and 
institutions. This medley of channels have ‘perforated’ traditional state sovereignty 
(Constantinou & Der Derian, 2010) by diffusing decision-making on national interests 
into additional cross-state venues of policy debate and regulatory coordination. Our 
vantage as public policy scholars affords an alternative perspective to the diplomacy 
literature, which is theoretically premised on International Relations concepts and 
empirical perspectives. We draw upon policy transfer (Marsh and Sharman, 2009), 
knowledge-utilisation (Boswell, 2009), and transnational policy network (Paár-Jákli, 
2014; Stone, 2013) concepts. These analytical lens bring into focus the micro-
processes and interactions that span borders, separate to the grand bargains and 
high politicking characteristic of international relations scholarship. We understand 
these interactions as political intercostalities. With etymology in anatomy to describe 
the internal interactions of muscles, nerves and other vessels to create bodily 
functions, we propose the term ‘intercostalities’ to characterise the informal, (often) 
unrecorded, difficult-to-discern interactions of non-state actors and institutions that 
connect to, move within, between and across established formal structures of the 
international system.  
 
Third, we engage in a transnational reorientation of policy studies (traditionally 
focused on national dynamics) to determine how the sciences – in the form of 
expertise, data or theories and models – are used to inform knowledge of (and 
institutional solutions for) transnational policy challenges. Policy studies can be 
connected to the so-called ‘new diplomacy’ (Pamment, 2013).  
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The dominant understanding of Science Diplomacy has been to equate it with 
scientific cooperation between nations with Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) as 
pivot institutional actors. This is no longer the case in an era of ‘cultural diplomacy’ 
(Clarke 2016), economic diplomacy (Woolcock, 2013), environmental diplomacy 
(Susskind and Ali, 2014), ‘water diplomacy’ (Islam and Susskind, 2012) and even 
‘vaccine diplomacy’ (Hotez, 2012). These modalities point to the multiplication of 
actors involved in diplomatic practices as well as, a ‘privatisation’ of, or at least 
devolutions of policy capacity, to non-state actors (Hocking, 2004).  
 
We depart from the narrow understanding of diplomacy as an official inter-
governmental process to capture three other sets of actors and institutions in science 
diplomacy. First, Science Diplomacy is conducted by international civil servants in 
international organisations like the World Bank, United Nations (UN) agencies or the 
Commonwealth. Second, they are complemented at the national level by public 
servants and government officers in health, telecommunications, transport, energy, 
law and justice who create trans-governmental policy networks (TGNs) with their 
foreign government counterparts.  Third, some non-state actors have become 
science diplomats through their professional activities and the internationalisation of 
scientific associations. The classic example are the Pugwash Conferences on 
Science and World Affairs with its tradition of ‘dialogue across divides’ to develop 
and support the use of scientific, evidence based policy making around the risks 
associated for nuclear warfare and weapons of mass destruction.   
 
We use the phrase ‘science’ in the broad sense as a systematically organized body 
of knowledge on a particular subject. This includes the knowledge of specific 
epistemic communities (Haas, 2015) such as cetologists and the long-term advice 
they have provided regarding whale populations for the International Whaling 
Commission. It also includes more heterodox groups of anthropologists, sociologists 
and economists advising on the Millennium now Sustainable Development Goals 
who collectively lack consensual knowledge on the causes of poverty.  In sum, 
‘science’ means not only what some call the SET subjects (science, engineering and 
technology) and others call the STEM subjects (natural and physical Sciences, 
Technology, Engineering and Mathematics), but also the behavioural and social 
sciences. 
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The structure of this paper is as follows: The first section speaks to the theme of this 
special edition by identifying science diplomacy as a modality of ‘research impact’ for 
universities.  In the second section, we shift to the transnational venues of Science 
Diplomacy. In doing so we adapt the Royal Society’s classic conceptualisation of the 
different types of science diplomacy:   
 informing foreign policy objectives with scientific advice (science in 
diplomacy);  
 facilitating international science cooperation (diplomacy for science);  
 using science cooperation to improve international relations between 
countries (science for diplomacy).  
Developed in conjunction with the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science (AAAS), this definition and categorisation by the Royal Society (2010) and 
AAAS has become the touch-stone in virtually all policy debates on science 
diplomacy, notwithstanding criticism of it (Smith, 2014).  It is useful for the purposes 
of this paper as it marks out three routes for researchers to achieve (and 
demonstrate) impact. The third section focuses on the governance implications of 
Science Diplomacy.  
 
1. The International Context of Research Impact 
Ostensibly, contemporary public administration recognises that policy-relevant 
evidence – the (social) sciences translated into a form amenable to decision-making 
– has a role in shaping decision-makers’ understanding of the fundamental problems 
they face. This is not an uncomplicated relationship: the perturbations of the debates 
around Brexit have exposed an undercurrent of public distrust in ‘experts’, according 
to prominent pro-Leave campaigners. Yet, amongst branches of government an 
appetite for scholarly research in UK public policy remains prominent.i And, indeed, 
academics today – in both social and natural sciences – have been left with little 
choice but to seek demonstrable policy engagement: UK universities’ adopted 
paradigm of ‘new managerialism’, in which monitoring, performance measurement 
and target-setting for research and teaching are the norm, enjoins scholars to 
become ‘ever more striving, self-monitoring, entrepreneurial and productive’ 
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(Leathwood & Read, 2013, 1164). This is in pursuit of promoting activities that 
produce ‘impact’ on society, the economy or government. Impact, in this application, 
is the ‘pronounced strategic and organisational focus on the transfer, translation and 
commercialisation of academic knowledge’ (Watermeyer, 2014, 359). For academics 
concerned with policy studies, ‘impact’ on government decision-making requires two 
moments: a moment in which impact is achieved and a moment in which impact is 
demonstrated. That means academics have a priori incentive to pursue research that 
has impact on government in a manner easily demonstrated. This persists despite a 
clear sense amongst researchers that transformational research, across academia, 
is not always immediately and demonstrably apparent and received as impactful:  
 
The history of knowledge production in the natural, medical and social 
sciences is full of examples where societal, religious and policy contexts have 
presented non-receptive settings for new ideas and those ideas have had to 
wait for the emergence of more receptive contexts for more developed 
recognition (Pettigrew, 2011) 
 
Research agendas are oriented towards the prevailing social or economic 
challenges identified as priorities (and funded accordingly) by government and non-
government funding bodies. Instrumental scholarship, functioning essentially as a 
guide-to-action for government, is often empiricist. This means an emphasis on 
gathering data – usually but not always quantitative – to accurately pinpoint social 
pathologies, to discern the contributing cause-and-effect mechanisms of those 
pathologies and prescribe suitable corrective action for government to take. Any 
research that falls short of these maxims cannot, by definition, produce the desired 
‘impact’. In this sense, utilitarian scholarship is usually geared around foundationist 
ontology and a positivist epistemology.  
 
There is a conflation here of the model of social versus the natural sciences, even 
though their contribution is markedly different. In this conflation, the ‘science’ 
component of social science has aped the template of knowledge discovery pursued 
in the natural sciences. This model of knowledge production regards the social and 
natural worlds as arranged around immutable causal laws. These laws are 
determinable by observing the social/natural world, gathering empirical data, and 
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generating testable, falsifiable theories (Bhaskar, 2013). Thus equipped with 
knowledge of causal social and natural laws, positivist social/natural science 
contends we can improve the human condition with the development of new 
technologies (innovation), new techniques of social enterprise (technocracy), and 
new modes of rational decision-making (evidence-based policy-making). It is only 
where the science is faulty or immature, or the decision-making and resource 
allocation irrational, that the pathologies of the world persist.  
 
The ascendency of the rationalist, instrumental forms of research are pivotal to 
Science Diplomacy and three prevailing touchstones of University administration: 
impact, funding and prestige. First, national funding bodies have undertaken 
extensive revision of their funding policies to place increasing primacy on research 
that promises new knowledge likely to be of discernible social or economic value. 
The Australian Research Council Discovery funding scheme, for example, asks 
applicants to identify where their work aligns with government’s socio-economic 
objectives and to list ‘evidence of research impact’, and specify the intended project 
impact.ii Likewise, research undertaken in collaboration with private enterprise, or 
research likely to be useful for government agencies, has become embedded in the 
criteria of funding assessment.  
 
Second, in straitened financial times, universities themselves have incentivised 
researchers to seek funding from diverse sources, including consultancies for private 
enterprise and government. Scholars’ work is thus structurally redirected through 
various types of Key Performance Indicators – such as witnessed with the growing 
interest of HE institutions, publishers and individual scholars in Altmetrics launched 
in 2010 – towards achieving impact in addition to generating external funding. Yet, 
consultancies for industry, government or civil society groups are largely short-term 
and rarely geared to the production of long-term projects. 
 
Third, achieving these imperatives is further influenced by the pursuit of research 
excellence. Universities are increasingly bifurcating academic staff into teaching- or 
research-intensive modes. Those given research support and teaching relief are 
those whose research is regarded as prestigious: this is gauged partly via the 
‘impact’ of their work, but increasingly though the international repute and reach 
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achieved by researchers.  These rationalist and instrumental understandings of 
research also feature in Science Diplomacy. 
 
‘Impact’ has become a form of ‘evidence’. For academics, ‘impact’ requires two 
moments: a moment in which impact is achieved and a moment in which impact is 
demonstrated. That means academics have a prior incentive to pursue research that 
has impact on government in a manner easily demonstrated.  The current policy 
regime in British higher education – specifically the UK Research Evaluation 
Framework - requires state-supported researchers or research teams to provide 
evidence and cases of ‘impact’, ‘influence’ and ‘relevance’. Smith, Ward and House 
(2011) see these imperatives as constraints on the research autonomy of scholars 
and anticipate struggles between ‘scientists competing for material and symbolic 
resources at the level of both inter- and intra-field struggles’. Drawing on Callon 
(2003) they further question whether impact measures can recognise the 
translational interplay of research and impact, where research moves from 
‘macrocosm to microcosm and back again, through acts of delegation, intermediation 
and representation’ (Smith et al. 2011).  
 
Pursuit of great managerial control over research is not confined to the UK. Outside 
the Higher Education funding context, there also pressures generated by other 
organisations for researchers and scientists to demonstrate an economic or social 
return. We consider briefly, research funded or contracted by (i) philanthropic 
foundations and NGOs; (ii) think tanks and consultancy firms; iii) international 
organisations and bilateral donors.  
 
Philanthropic foundations and large international NGOs contract research or 
otherwise fund knowledge advancement through various financial instruments 
(scholarships, grants, gifts and bequests or commissioned research). For instance, 
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) is said to have dramatically altered 
the global health research agenda through its grant instruments and initiatives like 
GAVI-Vaccine Alliance (Moran and Stone, 2016). In the UK, the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation or Nuffield Foundation similarly privilege funding research which 
demonstrably influences society or government. Through their own audit, or 
monitoring and evaluation process, these funders bring further requirements for 
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evidence of impact in terms of, inter alia, policy application or societal improvement 
or economic progress or political reform.  
 
Think tanks are twentieth century organisational inventions to ‘bridge research and 
policy’ (Stone, 2013). The raison d’etre of these organisations is to have impact. The 
best historical and contemporary example is RAND, a global think tank with a solid 
foundation in both policy analysis and scientific research. In general, the donors of 
think tanks can be demanding in requiring demonstration of impact on policy.  Think 
tanks have developed indicators of impact as ‘evidence’ for their donors and as 
‘track record’ for future funding requests. The London-based Overseas Development 
Institute has been a fore-runner in developing guidelines and tool-kits on building 
organisational capacity and strategies for policy influence and impact through its unit 
RAPID – Research and Policy in Development. RAPID approaches have also been 
diffused internationally through the Evidence Based Policy in Development Network. 
 
International Organisations are important actors in, and sources of, funding for 
(social) science. And while traditional treaty-based International Organisations have 
slowed in growth, in the past twenty years, the numbers of informal inter-
governmental organisations have ballooned (Vabulas, 2018) magnifying political 
intercostalities. Both types of International Organisation direct research funding 
towards international development, poverty alleviation, security and global public 
goods. Donors want to see utility from their investment in research. Development 
agencies - such as the International Development Research Centre in Canada and 
the Swiss Commission for Research Partnerships with Developing Countries 
amongst others (Stone, 2013) want to evaluate and document the effectiveness of 
that research. The World Bank commissioned an independent evaluation of its own 
research relevance (Banerjee et al., 2006) while UNESCO (2008) sponsored a long-
term programme on the transfer of social science research findings and data to 
decision-makers.  
 
Rather than ‘impacts’ being an agenda solely of higher education funders, this 
approach has wider currency and history in other institutional venues.  As a policy 
meme, the ‘impacts agenda’ has been diffused and transferred across policy sectors 
and organisations. The ‘impacts’ policy meme also enters transnational spheres of 
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science and research. We now turn to a more detail discussion of transnational 
challenges and how science diplomacy – as both a policy practice and scholarly 
enterprise – intersperses numerous institutions and governance layers as well as 
informal networks and global partnerships.  
 
2. Science Diplomacy in Transnational Venues.  
A simple definition of science Diplomacy “is the use of scientific collaborations 
among nations to address the common problems facing 21st century humanity and 
to build constructive international partnerships” (our emphasis, Federoff, 2008).  This 
definition is too limited as we argue that Science Diplomacy is not restricted to 
exchange only between nations. Instead science diplomacy practice has evolved to 
have wider transnational policy ramifications which the Royal Society categories can 
better accommodate.  Science diplomacy practice has evolved for three reasons.  
 
(i) The growth in transnational challenges: Contemporary policy problems do not 
respect national borders but transgress them. For example, the spread of disease in 
human populations as well as in agricultural production or natural ecologies, cyber-
security concerns, the use of bio-metric data in border control, and climate change. 
National economies and societies are beholden to the ebbs and flows of global 
trade, labour migration, financial services, digital communities and virtual 
communication in a relationship of structural interdependency.  They are all matters 
that demand the application of sophisticated syntheses of scientific knowledge.  
 
(ii) The disaggregation of transnational policy-making: The governance of 
transnational challenges is made complex and uncertain by the disaggregation of 
authority and decision-making in global spaces (Bevir, 2010). Although sovereign 
actors and International Organisations remain important mediators of state 
interests, increasingly non-state organisations are playing a role in the management 
of policy challenges. As a result, decision-making is disjointed and subject to 
political contest. The World Bank and United Nations can coalesce broad agendas 
for development and security, yet the delivery of initiatives is messy: state agencies 
vie with international NGOs, philanthropic trusts, private enterprise frequently 
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without agreed (or even common) objectives, regulatory or legal frameworks.  
Transnational administration takes place not only at multiple levels of governance 
but also as shared private-public governance which we depict below: 
 
Horizontal 
Governance 
Networks 
Working internationally across nation-state borders through trans-
governmental networks (TGNs) of government officials at the same 
level (legislators, judges and regulators who have cross-national 
counterparts). Officials from departments of health and education 
broker arrangements for the mutual recognition of qualifications and the 
certification of professionals. Other arrangements like the International 
Network for Environmental Compliance and the International Network 
for Government Science Advice or informal ‘Anglosphere’ arrangements 
like the Food Safety Quadrilateral Group (Legrand, 2015) engage in 
standard setting and ‘soft law’.  
Vertical 
Governance 
Networks 
Trans-governmental networks of public sector officials and international 
civil servants working internationally in multi-level policy coordination. 
For example, CSIRO (Australia’s Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organisation) has a longstanding role in CGIAR 
(Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research) where the 
World Bank has taken a central convening role. From 1998 the EU-US 
Agreement for Scientific and Technological Cooperation has been a 
vertical form of cooperation between the EU, its member states and the 
US (see Paár-Jakli, 2014). The Group of 20 works through summitry as 
well as technical working groups.  
Diagonal 
Governance 
Networks 
Working transnationally across the public-private divide where 
government officials and international civil servants formally and 
informally partner with private actors like philanthropic donors, scientific 
societies and research associations. This can be through global 
partnerships such as GAVI bankrolled by the Gates Foundation (Moran 
and Stone, 2016) or multi-stakeholder initiatives such as the 
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO – Nesadurai, 2013).  
 
 
These are interconnecting political vectors. Traditional diplomacy via MFAs is by 
definition, located within a state system. By contrast, the venues of Science 
Diplomacy can be more varied with (occasionally temporary) bases in universities, 
12 
 
think tanks, and laboratories or networked via conferences and seminars, scientific 
associations and research consortia. 
 
(iii) The turn to science diplomacy: The ascendancy of the rationalist tradition in 
public policy matters because it buttresses the deployment of scientific advisors in 
the understanding of governance challenges and legitimation of policy responses to 
matters such as economic inequality; social unrest; the depletion of natural resources 
or migration induced by climate-change. Indeed, where disputes occur over 
transnational policy issues, the science paradigm is rarely contested, even if aspects 
of scientific knowledge are oftentimes disputed. Climate change science, for 
example, has been beset by accusations that climatologists have overstated or 
misrepresented the science. Likewise, Japan’s government regularly defends its 
whaling programme by appealing to the scientific paradigm, even though its critics 
claim its program has little discernible scientific merit. These are international 
debates where science is politicised, although the primacy of the rationalist paradigm 
remains unassailed.  
 
These three dynamics of public policy paint a complex picture where transnational 
policy problems have drawn not only certain domestic officials into transgovernmental 
spaces of decision-making (horizontal, vertical and diagonal – Legrand, 2015) but 
also scientists and their associations. The Royal Society (2010) definition of science 
diplomacy is the recognised reference point (for critiques see Flink and Schreiterer, 
2010; Smith, 2014). Adapting the heuristic outlined in the Introduction, we have 
tailored these categories to better fit transnational governance challenges:  
 
Science in diplomacy: knowledge for global policy actors:   
Natural science scholarship has been used in global and regional settings to inform 
decision-making. For example, the knowledge generated by epistemic communities 
such as the cetologists mentioned earlier, but also “epicoms” informing international 
environmental regimes, the European Economic and Monetary Union or the 
development strategies in Latin America (Haas, 2015: 17). There are more heterodox 
groups lacking epistemic consensus such as those found in World Bank Global 
Programs like ‘Roll Back Malaria’, The Stop TB Initiative, and the partnership for 
Research and Training in Tropical Diseases. In these venues, the medical sciences 
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inform policy.  Likewise, at regional level, institutions generate demands for data, 
models, and an evidentiary base for decision-making. For example, the ASEAN 
Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution and its institutional apparatus of 
Technical Working Groups (Science, academic and technical); Conference of Parties; 
and Ministerial Steering Committee functions as a mode of horizontal 
transgovernmentalism but also interacts ‘diagonally’ with bodies like the ASEAN 
Regional Knowledge Network on Forests and Climate Change which brings in 
international research associations to deliberations.  
 
The contribution of social science scholarship in global settings is also apparent. A 
host of government and non-government actors routinely generate evidence-based 
best-practices of governance whether they are economists, political scientists, 
development experts, or human geographers. We see the causal models and metrics 
of social scientists applied in, for example, the OECD peer review processes (Pal, 
2016) or donor program evaluations towards attaining the Sustainable Development 
Goals. These models and metrics entail questions about the fairness of global trade, 
or the legacy of colonialism, or preferential commercial terms provided to 
multinational firms, all of which involve reflection on manifestly political and value-
laden issues.  
 
The provision of scientific information or social science advice does not automatically 
turn (social) scientists into diplomats or place them in transgovernmental settings. 
Nevertheless, certain individual researchers do act as brokers and communicators for 
scientific communities. Some build connections with domestic officials also operating 
as transgovernmental ‘new diplomats’ to forge new international relationships or 
transnational partnerships.  
 
Diplomacy for science: Transgovernmental capacity and science cooperation 
Some nations and organisations have progressed far in their science diplomacy and 
innovation strategies.  In the US there is increasing policy emphasis on Science, 
Technology and Innovation (STI) as an instrumentof ‘soft power’ (Nye, 2005). STI 
cooperation is one conduit to advance peace, prosperity, and security around the 
world such as with President Obama’s Science Envoy program launched in 2009 and 
the American Association for the Advancement of Science’s Center for Science 
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Diplomacy created in 2008.  South Korea is expanding its science diplomacy outside 
the Asian region to new markets in Africa and Latin America (Arkin, 2015).    
 
Of singular importance is the European Commission’s research agenda on Science 
and Cultural Diplomacy through Horizon 2020 (European Commission, 2014). As one 
advocate of the ‘soft power’ potential of European science diplomacy asserts: 
The EU is a world leader in research and innovations. With only 500 
million people or 7% of the world’s population, it accounts for 24% of world 
expenditure on research and 32% of high-impact publications and 32% of 
patent applications. ... In debates on the EU’s capacities as a global and 
regional player, research and technology should therefore be taken into 
account. The scientific potential of the EU should be considered as a 
strength that can be mobilised as a soft power tool. But this needs a vision 
on what to achieve as well as an organisational structure that clearly links 
the EU external action to Research and Technical Development (RTD) 
policy (van Langenhove, 2016: 28) 
The Commission is forthright in using the H2020 funding instrument as a lever to 
facilitate the EU’s external polices by coordinating closely with enlargement, 
neighbourhood, trade portfolios and its CFSP (Keukeleire et al, 2016).  
 
During its membership of the EU, the UK has been a major beneficiary of H2020 
funding and the earlier Framework Programmes. Post-Brexit, UK diplomacy for 
science is needed to promote UK science in the EU.  The Royal Society has already 
called upon the British government “to secure the UK’s competitiveness as a leading 
scientific nation by ensuring that the UK remains as closely engaged with EU 
research programmes, networks and facilities as possible”.iii  As a learned academy, 
The Royal Society is propelled into a quasi-diplomatic role over the terms of Brexit, 
to help ensure first, that EU researchers based in the UK have the right to remain, 
and second, to lobby for future science cooperation with the EU and in keeping 
channels of communication open with European counterpart academies.  
 
Science for diplomacy: Science as Aid and Understanding:   
Scientific knowledge is being placed at the forefront of global initiatives to resolve or 
ameliorate the prominent health, education, nutrition and development challenges 
15 
 
faced by developing nations. This is not new, and is a field where UNESCO has 
been deeply involved for 60 years (Standke, 2006). ‘Science-as-Aid’ complements, 
but does not supplant the provision of material aid to less developed countries, by 
enhancing the long-term capacity of these countries to forge their own resilience and 
prosperity. The Commonwealth hosts bodiess which coordinate and deploy scientific 
programs for developing countries: the Commonwealth Secretariat, the 
Commonwealth Foundation and the Commonwealth of Learning.  
 
More generally, science cooperation is often regarded as an indirect mechanism to 
cultivate ‘international understanding’. According to a former US Under Secretary for 
Economic Growth, Energy and the Environment, science is ‘based on disciplines and 
values that transcend politics, languages, borders and cultures’ (Hormats, 2012: 2). 
The view of science as a global endeavour is a common refrain (Nedeva, 2013: 
222). For example, the Commonwealth has a historical legacy in promoting science 
cooperation and technical assistance, such as via the Colombo Plan. Science for 
diplomacy among Commonwealth nations include formal agreements like the UK 
Science and Innovation Network in India. In general, the UK has a strong record in 
technical assistance recently enhanced through the Newton Fund. Launched in 
2014, to develop international science and innovation partnerships for economic 
development and improved quality of life, the Fund supports stronger bilateral 
relationships between the UK and sixteen partner countries (Grimes and McNulty, 
2016). 
 
One success story is the Reflora project, which enables the digital repatriation to 
Brazil of plant specimens held at the Royal Botanical Gardens at Kew in London. 
With support from the Newton Fund via the British Council professional development 
program, 93,439 Brazilian herbarium specimens from seventy families have been 
digitally repatriated to the Brazilian online repository; twenty-four Brazilian 
researchers visited Kew; and, as of December 2016, thirty-six research papers have 
been published, with a further seventy in preparation or under review (Grimes and 
McNulty, 2016). Reflora is enabling the UK and Brazil to meet their obligations under 
the Convention on Biological Diversity while also striving to reach the targets of the 
Global Strategy for Plant Conservation. 
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3. Evidence and Impact in Science Diplomacy Policy Processes 
Scholarly work on advisory systems per se has concentrated, in the Westminster 
context, on the role of cabinet offices and ministry level advice, recruitment of 
appropriately neutral and competent personnel, and more recently on the role of 
political advisors in cabinet offices. Leslie Pal (2016) identifies a split in the literature 
between public administration (the advisory side) and a policy studies (the analytical 
side) orientation. Yet, both approaches indicate that the quality of public policy will 
depend on its organization (administration) and its intellectual and evidentiary basis 
(capacity). 
 
This evidence-based trend has been particularly discernible in the UK. Since New 
Labour’s mantra of ‘what matters is what works’ took hold in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, evidence-based policy-making (EBPM) has entered the lexicon and toolkit of 
government officials around the world. EBPM represents an appeal to a sober, 
ostensibly value-neutral rationalisation of social problems and has been fundamental 
to the redesign of welfare policy (for example, the New Deal; see King and Wickham 
Jones, 1999; Walker 1999). The proponents of EBPM argue that rationality – 
understood as a utilitarian appraisal of policy problems and application of causal 
logics to achieve optimal socio-economic outcomes – should trump the value-laden 
dogma of ideological politics. The value of ‘well-founded’ and ‘objective’ research is 
acclaimed (Solesbury, 2002: 95). The ambition of a rationalist, anti-dogma, 
evidence-based policy-making approach led to the creation sub-units of the UK 
government with a mandate to collate or generate scientific knowledge for policy, 
such as the Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU) and the Centre for Management 
and Policy Studies (CMPS) alongside national funding via the Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC) for the Centre for Evidence-Based Policy. The UK is 
replete with other longer standing bodies for the organisation of science advice such 
as the Government Office for Science, and departmental science advisors (such as 
the Chief Medical Officer) as well as bodies like the Royal Society.  
 
Policy capacity has been defined as “the ability to marshal the necessary resources 
to make intelligent collective choices about and set strategic directions for the 
allocation of scarce resources to public ends” (Painter & Pierre, 2005: 2).  The policy 
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analytic capacity approach to policy advisory systems, and the related field of 
evidence-based (or informed) policy making, has burgeoned in recent years (see 
Boswell, 2009; Head, 2013). The externalisation of policy analysis and research is 
well recognised as having positive attributes in increasing the quality and variety of 
evidence, and the spread of innovation.  Although the international dimensions of 
policy advice may be mentioned (Gluckman, 2016), these studies have tended to 
focus on domestic institutions and processes. A recent review acknowledges the 
gap, noting that more empirical inquiry is needed of “supranational advisory units” 
(Craft & Halligan, forthcoming 2016). Even so, work is already underway (Pal, 2016; 
Trondal, 2016), especially concerning the role of expertise in International 
Organisations (Littoz-Monet, 2017).  
 
Not only are the prospects for enhanced transnational science collaboration manifold 
but so too the prospects for impact for political science and international studies in 
the far more diverse landscape of mixed public-private and network initiatives.  In 
these settings, scientific knowledge – or simply evidence presented in support of 
best-practice – is a crucial resource for officials.  Impact opportunities arise not only 
in helping build scientific and policy analytic capacity in these new venues but also in 
working with new diplomats.  
 
Bureaucrats and other state representatives need to work alongside, and sometimes 
through non-state networks. This calls for a different kind of negotiation than ‘old’ 
state driven, understandings of diplomacy. 21st century dynamics of transnational 
political intercostalities call for a reconfiguration of the way nationally based public 
services or civil services interact with the outside world. Bureaucratic capacity to 
engage the diversity of world-wide network proliferation will be enhanced by treating 
‘transnational public administration’ as a diplomatic field. 
 
There are challenges in the ad hoc nature of transnational governance. There is 
uncertainty over what forms of collaboration are possible or available; an absence of 
joined-up approaches between domestic agencies on common agendas as well as 
tensions between MFAs envious of incursion onto their turf by the disaggregated 
approaches overseas of line departments. Policy scholars are one set of academics 
well placed to evaluate the (potential) roles of nationally based science advisors in 
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forums as diverse as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) “chief science 
advisors and equivalents” group on one side of the world or the European 
Parliament’s Science and Technology Options Assessment (STOA) on the other as 
well as in global forums like the Panel or the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Control (Gluckman, 2016). 
 
Science Diplomacy has been almost entirely neglected by public policy scholars 
(Fahnrich, 2015). As yet, public policy scholars have not developed a coherent 
corpus of theoretical or empirical work conceptualising or cataloguing the core actors 
and agencies transnational governance architectures, networks and processes who 
have limited engagement with both International Relations and ‘global administrative 
law’ scholars (for these critiques see Coen and Pegrem, 2015; Ladi and Stone, 
2015).   
 
In this regard, our paper (and larger project) is unique within extant studies of 
science diplomacy. To-date, there is almost no conceptualisation, nor mapping of 
trans-governmental diplomacy or of science diplomacy either convened or funded by 
formal International Organisation. According to the Union of International 
Associations (2013), there are now well over 800 active international and regional 
organisations. Little scholarly attention is devoted to small and specialised or 
relatively ‘young’ International Organisations such as for example, the Green Climate 
Fund, the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT, 
or a dozen other international fisheries bodies) or the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat 
created in 2003. By the very nature of their mandate, their operations rest upon 
marshalling scientific evidence. As one of these organisations states: “Science 
underpins the management decisions made by ICCAT”.iv  
 
Growing in number at a faster rate than these formal intergovernmental 
organisations, there is a growing array of informal international associations, such as 
the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Group of 20 and the Clean Energy 
Ministerial (Vabulas, 2018), matching the growth of transgovernmental policy 
networks and ‘global public-policy partnerships’ like GAVI, RSPO and the Roll Back 
Malaria partnerships mentioned earlier. Many of them deal with highly specialised 
and technical matters of international policy.  From time to time they are drawn into 
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science diplomacy even though their officers and secretariats may not refer to such 
activity in these terms. Accordingly, our paper represents a research agenda for a 
particular mode of ’impact’ in politics and international studies.  
 
Our concern is with the policy, politics and administration of science diplomacy.  
Rather than assuming that science and politics ‘should be natural allies’, the reality 
of networked diplomacy and the administrative challenges it imposes on 
bureaucracies entail significant policy challenges bringing the two together.  
Australia’s Chief Scientist (2012) stated that global problems need solutions “to be 
based not only on sound science, but on sound politics as well”.  Likewise, Sir Peter 
Gluckman, head of the INGSA science advisors network, speaks of ‘post-normal 
science’ characterising global challenges. That is, “areas where the science is 
complex and inevitably incomplete and where the interface with societal values is 
often in dispute.  ...climate change, food security, population health, and terrorism ... 
have trans-jurisdictional and diplomatic dimensions” (2016). 
 
By recognising the movements of horizontal, vertical and diagonal political 
intercostalities, the analytical focus is shifted to the praxis of science diplomacy 
within and across different interstices of governance.  It is messy, but it is the real 
world. In order to be effective, government officials need to respond to transnational 
policy problems with counterpart public servants in governments overseas; with 
officials in international organisations and executives of global public-private 
partnerships, and with expert partners in research communities and scientific 
associations. The diplomatic field diversifies to a wider constellation of actors 
tackling global problems with science. Nevertheless, these are concerns of social 
science and public administration too.  
 
The realities of transnational administration necessitate new skills and capacities 
among public servants with implications for recruitment and training. Policy officials 
(outside MFAs) are not necessarily adequately equipped to effectively engage with 
transnational policy communities. Training, resourcing and new practices in specific 
policy sectors suggest reform to build the transnational capacities of government 
agencies. Inter alia, senior managers may need to see their workforce develop greater 
abilities in network management and inter-cultural understanding; heightened 
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bureaucratic competence to access and navigate the bureaucracies of international 
organisation, global partnerships and international funding regimes; increased 
knowledge of international bench-marking and ‘soft law’, in addition to technical 
proficiency in the substantive policy area.  Mainstreaming science diplomacy across 
government departments entails new roles for front line bureaucratic agents.  
 
Some of these front-line agents will be co-opted and contracted from universities and 
scientific institutes. Likewise, the individual researchers based in universities may not 
have either innate diplomatic skills or keen knowledge of global policy processes. 
Not only is civil service recruitment and training likely to be transformed by the 
dynamics of transnational administration, so too universities will increasingly look to 
recruit and train their own science diplomats. To conclude with the claim of the 
special editors that political science, public policy and international relations is one of 
the most ‘impactful’ disciplines in higher education (see also Stoker et al, 2014), 
Science Diplomacy offers considerable scope for these fields, and the higher 
education sector more generally, to seek and attain ‘impact’.  
 
 
* Tim Legrand is Lecturer at the National Security College at the Australian National 
University, and adjunct Associate Professor in the Institute for Governance and 
Policy Analysis at the University of Canberra.  
** Diane Stone is Diane Stone is Professor at the University of Warwick, Centenary 
Professor at the University of Canberra and Visiting Professor at Central European 
University.  
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Endnotes 
i See Caroline Kenny’s analysis of the influence of scholarly research on Parliament. 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2015/10/19/the-impact-of-uk-
academia-on-parliament/ 
 
ii See, for example: http://www.arc.gov.au/discovery-program-funding-rules#DP 
 
iii https://royalsociety.org/topics-policy/projects/brexit-uk-science/ 
 
iv  http://www.iccat.org/en/ 
                                                 
